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Introduction
Risk regulation has often been considered as a domain favorable to the occurrence of deliberation, and a promising testing field for deliberative theories in public regulation, especially in the transnational space 1 . The underlying assumption is that the scientific and technical questions arising in the regulation of risk-entailing products and technologies, as well as the accompanying scientific uncertainty, are likely to encourage a collective search for truth and for the best policy. 2 In the EU the networked system of governance in comitology and the Council has often been considered as fulfilling the special pre-conditions for successful deliberation. 3 Back in 2001 Christian Joerges in an article on the role of science within democratic risk management has re-stated the thesis that "the regulation of transnational markets should be guided by "transnational deliberative fora" which would become the basis of legitimate transnational governance; among the three levels of governance -the nation-state, the EU, WTO -the EU comes closest to that ideal." 4 This defense of deliberative supranationalism 5 has become the basis for the second dimension of the successor theory of European Conflicts Law
Constitutionalism (CLC): namely the claim that European law in general and
European transnational governance in particular can be re-interpreted as European conflicts-law, because they derive their legitimacy from existent deliberative practices, which are constitutionalized through procedural norms of transnational cooperation. 6 In a similar vein, other theorists of EU governance have identified the challenge to deliberative theories such as CLC and experimentalist governance. At the same time, it also offers important insights into the pre-conditions of successful deliberation in European decision-making. By analyzing the problems of EU governance of GMOs as well as their causes this chapter seeks to enhance our understanding of the scope conditions of successful deliberation in transnational governance.
I. Re-framing the problem of GMO regulation: politicization and scientification as co-producing trends
Since the establishment of the first EU harmonizing measures for the cultivation of GMOs back in the 1990s this area has developed from a low-profile technical into a political issue of high salience on the EU agenda. The authorization of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 10 as food, feed and agricultural products in the EU continues to be one of the most gridlocked policy fields on the Union's agenda despite continuous reform efforts. "… a political agreement on the GMO dossier is not possible" concluded the Danish EU presidency in 2012 referring to its failed attempt to push forward the adoption of new legal rules on the agricultural cultivation of GMOs in the EU. 11 The proposed reform aims to grant the Member States more freedom to restrict or ban GMO cultivation on their territories, 12 and thereby to resolve the yearlong stalemate in the EU authorization of GMO crops. 13 Over the last 20 years the controversy 14 surrounding this policy area has divided the EU not only politically, but also geographically. At the moment there are over 10 Article 2 of Directive 2001/18 defines GMO as 'organism(s), with the exception of human beings, in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination. hundred voluntary 'GMO-free regions' in the EU. 15 Preferences (and as their basis beliefs, risk perceptions and socio-economic interests) with regard to GMO cultivation differ greatly among the Member States. Moreover, several Eurobarometer surveys have indicated that a majority of European citizens opposes the use of GMOs as food and in agriculture. 16 All these factors make EU agreement on common authorizations difficult, if not impossible, as evidenced by the yearlong deadlock in both comitology and the Council of Ministers.
Conflicts (i.e. legal and political disagreement) are perpetuated in the postauthorization phase. Several MS have banned GMO cultivation on their territory in response to strong anti-GM movements at home. While the Commission considers these bans to be unlawful it is powerless to lift them against a qualified majority of national representatives in the Council and comitology. The only issue MS were able to agree upon over the past decade (since the enactment of the reformed GMO framework in [2001] [2002] [2003] was that the Commission should not be entitled to lift national GMO bans against the will of the Member States, and their citizens. 17 This is a profound contestation of the Commission's authority to decide on GMO cultivation for the Union as a whole.
All this seems to suggest that the high politicization of decision-making on GMO cultivation is the main factor preventing successful deliberation in Council and comitology. Mark Pollack and Greg Shaffer, indeed, have agued that the GMO issue is not conductive to the sort of deliberative decision-making in the comitology process advocated by Joerges due to the intense politicization of the issue in public opinion.
According to them, politicization '… has severely limited the ability of member-state representatives to engage in the sort of deliberative search for better policy depicted in the Habermasian literature. In this sense, our analysis lends further support to the view that transparency and politicization decrease the prospect for deliberation in transnational bodies, which appears to function most effectively in closed, in-camera settings. If confirmed by other studies, this finding suggests a stark normative trade-off between transparency and openness, on the one hand, and deliberative decision-making on the other (last emphasis added).'
While politicization certainly hampers a deliberative problem-oriented type of decision-making, how appropriate is it to draw a causal link from transparency to politicization and, further, to failure of deliberation? Are we in this way not omitting a part of the problem analysis? In this chapter it is submitted that the problems of GMO regulation in the EU are rooted not only in the politicization and decisional deadlock within comitology. Along with this goes another equally salient dimension of the GMO governance failure: namely the de-facto shift from de-centralized to unilateral top-down decision-making combined with the scientification 18 of the authorization process.
This other dimension points us to a sort of 'parallel reality' of GMO regulation. The two main EU institutions responsible for GMO authorizations, the European Commission and its expert agency, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), continue to approve GMOs. Despite strong opposition from several Member
States and the public, 19 under the current legal framework 20 the Commission has authorized every GMO application submitted to it following in each case a positive EFSA opinion finding no risks to human or animal health or the environment.
Moreover, high-ranking EU officials have publicly taken a pro-GMO stance in an attempt to end what some perceive as a 'GMO psychosis.' 21 Anne Glover, the chief scientific advisor of Commission President Barroso, has publicly criticized opposition to GMOs on grounds of health protection and environmental safety as lacking robust scientific evidence and declaring the precautionary principle as being no longer relevant with GMO foods or crops. 22 Last year, a report of the European Academies Advisory Council, a body representing national science academies in the EU and 18 The notions of politicisation and scientification, although in a slightly different form, in M.
Everson & E. Vos, 'The scientification of politics and the politicisation of science' in idem (eds) Uncertain risks regulated (Routledge-Cavendish 2009) 1. 19 It follows that Pollack and Shaffer's analysis does not consider the arguably very important role, which top-down decision-making combined with scientification plays in contributing to the increased politicization of GMO regulation. In fact, the EU experience with GMO authorization over the last 20 years is strongly marked by the clash between these two above-described trends, namely between politicization on the one hand and scientification on the other hand. Until today no settled view exists on how to define the actual problem with regulating GMOs. While some blame the polarized public debate calling for more science-based regulation, others see the over-reliance on science as the root of the problem. To understand the problems of GMO regulation in Europe (and importantly also to draw lessons for other fields of risk regulation) it is, therefore, of crucial importance to analyze the interconnection between both politicization and scientification as dynamic processes. In other words, we need to analyze the ways in which both processes are interrelated, and are potentially co-producing 26 each other. The following sections begin to address this task by analyzing the dynamics of GMO regulation between legislative ideals and institutional practices (II.). A subsequent section (III.) considers the potential of the 2010 reform proposal to re-nationalize GMO cultivation to offer an escape route out of the regulatory stalemate. The chapter concludes with some final remarks (IV.) on the promise of deliberation in European risk governance. 23 See http://www.easac.eu/about-easac/what-is-easac.html. 24 http://www.euractiv.com/science-policymaking/chief-eu-scientist-backs-damning-news-530693. 25 For an explanation of the term S. Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). 26 The notion is being adapted from S. Jasanoff (ed), States of Knowledge, The co-production of science and social order (London: Routledge, 2004), 1.
II. GMO regulation between legislative rules and administrative practices
The current EU legal framework for GMOs 27 underwent significant reform in the years 2001 to 2003 as part of a wider overhaul of the Union's food safety regime in the aftermath of the BSE crisis. 28 The current rules, firstly, respond to the institutional failures 29 of EU food safety regulation uncovered by the BSE and other food safety crises, which occurred during the 1990s. 30 Secondly, reforming the authorization procedure for GMOs was an essential pre-condition to ending the then EU de-facto moratorium on the authorization of GMOs, 31 and thereby the transatlantic conflict over GMO trade. 32 Since its establishment in the academic literature the legal framework has been assessed as a promising example of precautionary transnational governance 33 for its effort to reconcile two potentially conflicting notions of legitimacy, namely the scientific and the political legitimacy of GMO authorizations. Mindful of the disastrous experiences with relying on scientific advice during the BSE crisis, the EU legislator based the new GMO rules on the precautionary principle, 34 which requires 27 It covers the import, export, and production of GMOs; their deliberate release into the environment for both marketing and other purposes; labeling and traceability of GMOs; and their placing on the market as food and feed products. justifying authorization decisions along two different trajectories. 35 On the one hand, authorizations have to be based on a scientific risk assessment, and thus follow a scientific rationality. On the other hand, the Commission adopts the final decision in cooperation with national representatives according to the comitology procedure. It is not bound by EFSA's risk assessment, but has to take into consideration both possible scientific uncertainties and other legitimate factors. 36 Risk management, therefore, is essentially a political process aiming at mediating scientific and nonscientific (e.g. consumer-related, socio-economic, ethical or cultural) aspects of GMO cultivation.
As this chapter will show, however, the implementation practice of GMO authorization in the EU is far from realizing this ideal. The reality of GMO regulation is instead characterized by the failure on the part of the participating institutions to achieve a balanced and cooperative decision-making able to reconcile scientific and political legitimacy. Instead, regulation is caught in-between two conflicting trends, namely that of scientification of the Commission's risk management, on the one hand, and that of politicization and resulting deadlock of comitology decisionmaking, on the other hand (see below at 2.).
The legal framework: cooperative problem solving and precautionary risk governance
The 2001-2003 EU legal framework seems to recognize the complexity both in societal and in scientific terms of decision-making on GMO authorizations. 37 It responds with a procedural solution, which aimed at structuring the process of authorization as a cooperative effort of various actors through which both the scientific and political legitimacy of GMO regulation ought to be reconciled. The matrix of the new legislative design for GMO authorization is de-centralized administrative cooperation. 38 As noted in the literature, it constitutes 'a transnational governance regime which cuts across national/supranational and public/private 35 distinctions, and which both guides and is accountable to scientific communities, national food authorities and civic society.' 39 Shared responsibility and, in fact, shared authority for GMO authorizations is therefore a key feature of this regulatory regime. 40 The legal framework, however, does contain some important features of centralized top-down regulation. 41 Firstly, it almost totally harmonizes national provisions concerning GMO commercialization both as food and as plants for agricultural cultivation. 42 Moreover, the legislation has introduced the principle of prior-authorization for all GMO products on the EU market requiring every GMO to undergo an individual safety assessment before it can be placed on the market. 43 In this administrative process of prior-authorisation, the Commission has been granted the exceptional competence of direct implementation (Article 291 (2) TFEU) of GMO rules. 44 It, therefore, acts as the central EU administrative authority adopting (following comitology) legally binding decisions directly vis-à-vis private companies applying for authorisation. 45 At the same time, however, the private applicant (i.e. a biotech company wanting to market a GM product) has been granted an active coregulatory 46 role within the authorization procedure. This is due to the shift of the burden of proof 47 for the safety of the GMO product to be authorized to the applicant. Seen as an expression of the precautionary principle, the reversed burden of proof entails that, not the regulatory authority demonstrate the existence of risks, but the applicant, as the risk producer, has to demonstrate the safety of its product adequately and sufficiently. 48 At the same time, a remarkable feature of the GMO framework is the mitigation of these top-down and command-and-control elements by both the legal indeterminacy of the substantive safety requirements for GMO products and the strong proceduralization of the authorization process. In other words, the legal provisions lay down a dense procedural and institutional framework for GMO authorisation whereas substantive requirements for authorisation are rather indeterminate, and need further definition and concretization in the process of administrative implementation. Notions, such as that GMOs should not have 'adverse effects on human health and the environment' or not be 'nutritionally disadvantageous' are highly technical and require scientific expertise. To decide whether a product fulfils them, and has, therefore, to be authorised, pre-supposes a set of prior decisions and activities, such as the generation of knowledge about the possible effects of GMOs, of conventions about when these effects will be considered as adverse, etc. In this way the Commission, as the final administrative authority, is granted a wide epistemic discretion when authorizing GMOs, which means that it is left to the Commission, together with its expert agency, to determine how the requirement of GMO safety should best be measured or realized. 49 In other words, the concretisation of the substantial safety requirements laid down in the legislative rules is being 'outsourced' to the administrative process of rule implementation with EFSA's regulatory scientists playing a crucial role in this process (see below 2.1.).
In order to compensate for their loss of ex-ante substantive control, the EU legislator has provided for a dense procedural framework to 'orchestrate' 50 the input of various actors into the authorization process. Two interconnected institutional principles were crucial in shaping this framework. On the one hand, the legal 48 Therefore also carrying the financial and personal burden of proving safety. In practice, however, this gives the applicant strong de-facto influence over the safety assessment process. See analysis in M. Weimer 'Democratic Legitimacy through European Conflicts-Law? The case of EU administrative governance of GMOs', (Florence, EUI PhD thesis, 2012). 49 framework has been based on the precautionary principle. 51 On the other hand, and as an expression of the latter, 52 the GMO authorization procedure is governed by the principle of risk analysis. 53 Seen together these principles express the idea that GMO authorization decisions should be able to reconcile two potentially conflicting rationalities: a scientific and a political rationality. 54 The former underlies the process of risk assessment as an independent, objective and transparent process of scientific evaluation of GMO risks, thereby providing the overall administrative process with cognitive or functional legitimacy. 55 The latter, in contrast, should govern the process of risk management, which is seen as a process of 'weighing policy alternatives in consultation with interested parties', and which not only takes into account the outcome of risk assessment, but also other non-scientific legitimate factors, 56 as well as the precautionary principles and scientific uncertainty. 57 Political rationality can therefore be seen as securing both the normative and democratic legitimacy of GMO authorisations in the EU. ECR II-3305 the EU General Court has confirmed this interpretation of the precautionary principle stating that the latter is based on the idea that scientific legitimacy is not sufficient to underpin regulatory decisions on risk, but must be complemented by a political legitimacy provided for by the risk manager who is democratically accountable and has the discretion to take into consideration other factors than the results of the scientific risk assessment. 55 In institutional terms, while the Commission acts as risk manager of GMO authorizations, EFSA, a quasi-regulatory EU agency, is the risk assessor. At the same time, both actors have been embedded in a de-centralised transnational network, which essentially aims at involving other actors in the decision-making thereby preventing unilateral action of the EU institutions. On the one hand, before authorizing GMOs the Commission is obliged to follow the comitology examination procedure (former regulatory committee procedure). Ideally, the involvement of a comitology committee representing the Member States should compensate for the loss of national regulatory competences by serving as a forum for them to express their concerns, and to raise arguments about, for example, socio-economic or long-term environmental impact of GMO commercialisation on their national economies, agricultures, biodiversity, etc. 59 The new comitology rules adopted in 2010 explicitly stress the deliberative element of this administrative process. 60 On the other hand, EFSA has been designed not as superior to national scientific authorities, but as a networked agency that promotes networking and scientific co-operation between national authorities while mediating divergent scientific risk assessments. 61 Another important instance of de-centralised governance within the GMO framework is the management of so-called co-existence measures after an EU authorization has been granted. Co-existence refers to problems of admixture between different agricultural production systems, namely between GM, conventional and organic crops. Because of the diversity of farming conditions across the EU national, regional and local aspects (e.g. small family farms or big agribusiness, different preferences for organic farming etc) are particularly important for co-existence. To ensure that critical geographical, ecological and climatic conditions that affect crop production can be taken into account this area has been explicitly excluded from the scope of EU harmonisation. 62 Democratic legitimacy is achieved when the regulatory activity complies with certain models of democratic governance, for example, representative, participatory, or deliberative, at 146. However, GMO rules have also foreseen that national co-existence measures should be coordinated by the Commission. The Commission shall gather and coordinate information, observe developments and develop guidelines on coexistence. The main instrument used for this purpose so far has been a 'soft' Commission recommendation (hereinafter Co-existence Recommendation). 63 Therein the Commission formulated non-binding general principles for the development of national co-existence measures. In order to coordinate national coexistence strategies the Commission established two networks, 64 within which both national and EU experts are supposed to exchange information, develop best practices and advice on co-existence.
As a consequence, the management of co-existence has been described as proceeding by way of multi-level expert networks, which resemble governance structures characteristic for the European Open Method of Coordination (OMC). 65 National and regional diversity was declared an important value, and top-down control through EU harmonisation and centralisation of authority was to be avoided. for mediation between two conflicting logics of political action in the EU; namely between the politics of hazard, which embrace uncertainty in order to realise new public goods and the politics of anxiety, which rejects uncertainty to protect the vulnerability, status and singularity of the individual subject. 67 Maria Lee, in one of the most comprehensive scholarly analyses of EU regulation of GMOs at present, concludes 'The organisation of the legislation attempts to tread a delicate path between national and central authorities and between reaping the benefits and protecting public interests, as well as between scientific and political understandings of GMOs. The sensitivity of the balance is emphasised by the uncertainty that pervades our understanding of effects in this area, not to mention public awareness of that uncertainty. 68 '
The practice of GMO regulation: subversion of precautionary risk governance by technocratic rule?
The idea of a cooperative and de-centralised management of GMO risks, which seems to have guided the legislative design, is far from being realized in the current practice of GMO regulation. The reality of GMO regulation is instead characterized by the failure of the legal structures described in the previous section to achieve a balanced deliberative decision-making able to reconcile scientific and political legitimacy. Instead, the institutional practice is caught in-between the scientification of the Commission's risk management on the one hand, and the politicization of comitology decision-making on the other hand. Moreover, the following analysis shows problematic shifts of authority, which go beyond the system of shared responsibility envisaged by the EU legislator. Instead of administrative cooperation between national and supranational actors in the risk management phase, top-down decision-making by the Commission dominates the process. 67 See Chalmers, Risk and Anxiety, supra n. 27, at 669. 68 Lee, EU regulation of GMOs, supra n. 14 at 102. See for a more critical view with regarding to the practice of GMO authorization M. Lee, 'Multi-level Governance of Genetically Modified Organisms in the European Un-ion: Ambiguity and Hierarchy,' in Bodiguel, Luc and Cardwell, Michael (eds) The regulation of genetically modified organisms : comparative approaches, (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2010).
EFSA as an uncertainty intolerant epistemic authority of GMO authorizations?
Since EFSA's establishment cooperation with national scientific authorities on GMO risk assessments has been hampered by lack of trust and conflicting views over GMO safety. An external evaluation report from 2011 on the EU legislative framework in the field of GMO cultivation (EPEC report) 69 authorities, in practice it 75 seems to assert scientific authority by overriding national safety concerns about GMOs during the risk assessment. In this field, it therefore fails to fulfill its legally envisaged function as a mediator between different national risk assessors, and a networked agency.
Marjolein Van Asselt and Ellen Vos have shown that EFSA tends to dismiss risk claims or indications of scientific uncertainty by way of discarding certain arguments as non-scientific, or as not being part of the risk assessment -something scholars of science studies have termed 'boundary work.' 76 For example, EFSA used boundary work in order to construct a boundary between risk assessment and risk management, or to reduce the scope of risk assessment by discarding possible uncertainties about the interference of GMOs with the European environment and regular maize crops as non-scientific concerns. 77 The exclusion of risk management and mitigation issues from the scope of EFSA's assessment has also been criticized in the 2011 external evaluation report. 78 By drawing boundaries and dismissing competing claims EFSA manages to construct authority, and to produce authority claims. As Van Asselt and Vos have observed, 'The GMO Panel often mobilized "the scientific literature," but without specific references or they just agree with some particular findings or conclusions, without providing further justification. Through this ex cathedra style, EFSA presented itself as an authoritative voice.' 79 There also seems to be little trust between national authorities and EFSA, especially when scientific views differ. Only few bilateral meetings to discuss scientific divergences between EFSA and the Member States 80 have been held so far.
Where they were held, Member States authorities felt that the outcomes of these meetings were not entirely satisfactory due, for example, to lack of sufficient time 75 Reference is made to the operation of the EFSA scientific panel responsible for GMO risk assessments. No conclusions are being drawn with regard to EFSA's operation in other food policy areas. 76 Van Asselt and Vos define this term in reference to Thomas F. Gieryn as "a strategic and purposeful act in which boundaries are drawn between realms, for example, between science and non-science and between science and politics. Boundary work involves drawing and maintaining contrasts through selective attributions, which effectively demarcate in order to construct 'self-evident' justification and 'superiority in designated terrains. ' 81 As a DG Sanco official reports, scientific meetings at EFSA between national and EFSA scientists take place within a rather hostile atmosphere. 82 There also seems to be little incentive for EFSA to strive at more consensus with its national counter-parts. EFSA often rather strives at asserting its own scientific authority in order to convince the Commission to follow its view. 83 Moreover, the quality of scientific risk assessment, which constitutes a metareview by EFSA of the data and analyses provided by the applicant company, has often been strongly criticized by several stakeholders including national authorities, Maize 1507 is an insect-resistant genetically modified maize characterized by the insertion of two genetic constructs: one which produces Cry1F, a protein that makes the maize resistant to certain Lepidoptera (larvae of the European corn borer and of the Mediterranean corn borer), and another which makes the maize tolerant to glufosinate ammonium, an herbicide which use will be phased out in the EU by 2017.
Since the initial submission of the application by the company Pioneer in 2001 a total of six scientific opinions have been produced by EFSA throughout the years. Both Member States and independent institutes have raised concerns over potential risks to human health and the environment as well as strong objections as to the quality of EFSA's risk assessment. In its initial risk assessments EFSA remained reluctant to seriously engage with these contesting views on the safety of maize 1507. Likely being aware of the political pressure to provide authoritative scientific advice as the new expert agency EFSA framed its advice in definite terms. It concluded that the cultivation of maize 1507 'will not have adverse effects on human health and/or the environment.' (emphasis added) 90 In its subsequent opinions EFSA held on to this conclusion despite strong criticism and conflicting scientific studies. 91 87 See for a similar conclusion with regard to several cases of GMO assessment see Poli, 'Scientific advice' supra n. 75 who, at 130, notes that in the period 2010 and 2012 EFSA started paying closer attention to the interactions between GMO crops and the environment, and made efforts to answer concerns raised by Member States and NGOs. 88 The following account is based on a forthcoming empirical study by M. Weimer & G. Pisani (of file with the authors). 89 Another similarly controversial case has been the authorization of BASF's 'Amflora' Potato, which for reasons of space cannot be discussed here in detail. Moreover, it engaged in boundary work by rejecting to consider the issue of adequacy of the applicant's monitoring plan in relation to potential adverse effects on non-target organisms as beyond outside of the scope of risk assessment. 92 Interestingly, however, starting from 2010 EFSA has shown a slight yet meaningful change in its approach by providing a more nuanced answer to the Commission's request, acknowledging the need to improve its methodology, the existence of knowledge gaps as well as potential risks arising from the cultivation of maize 1507. The change followed a Commission request for a new EFSA opinion this time based on scientific questions raised by a new independent study made available to the Commission. 93 The study raised a number of objections to the conclusions made by EFSA, 
Politicization, deadlock and reversion to hierarchy in comitology
EFSA's constructed scientific authority has strong de-facto influence on the outcome of authorisation decisions taken by the Commission within comitology. In the authorisation practice hitherto the Commission ultimately followed every scientific opinion issued by EFSA, all of which were in favor of authorizing the product. In no case did the Commission exercise its discretion to depart from EFSA's advice for example on the basis of socio-economic concerns or with reference to scientific uncertainty and the need for a precautionary approach. 98 However, in view of the new Commission practice developed over the last couple of years to delay authorisations while referring opinions back to EFSA for an update, it may no longer be adequate to compare the Commission with a blind driver receiving directions from the passenger in the back seat. 99 The Commission does not follow EFSA blindly, but so far it did always follow EFSA's advice in the end even if with considerable delay. This indicates that the Commission is often, especially in controversial cases of GMO cultivation, paralyzed between EFSA's scientific opinion and national as well as public opposition to GMO cultivation. Above all, it is not able, or does not see itself as being entitled, 100 to exercise political discretion, and to depart from EFSA's advice even where there are indications of scientific uncertainty or strong socioeconomic objections. It should be emphasized that from the Commission's point of view, EFSA's epistemic authority seems to be the only legitimate basis for the authorization decision, which ultimately contributes to the loss of political responsibility for GMO authorisations in the EU. Importantly, the comitology process, due to its malfunctioning in this field, fails to mitigate this problem. 98 The failure of deliberative decision-making in Council and comitology committees in the GMO field are well researched. 101 Since the restarting of authorisations in 2004, the Commission was able to push through all new applications for GMO authorisations despite the lack of approval on the part of the national representatives. The decision-making process in each case was highly politicised and accompanied by strong opposition on the part of the majority of Member States within the comitology procedure. All the Commission draft decisions were referred to the Council (under the old comitology rules) and could be adopted only because of the Qualified Reversed Majority Voting (QRMV) rule in the regulatory procedure. 102 Shaffer and Pollack describe the nature of decision-making across both comitology committees and the Council as 'a record of persistent conflict, bargaining from fixed positions, formal votes on nearly every proposed decision, substantial numbers of abstentions (representing a refusal to take a position) and ultimate deadlock.' 103 Recent research indicates that this practice continues also under the new comitology rules, 104 since the Commission has maintained the right to adopt decisions by default in case the newly established appeals committee fails to deliver an opinion. 105 The political deadlock in the Council is thus being reproduced in the new forum of the appeals committee.
All this leads to the de-facto ineffectiveness of the national input into the authorisation process. Instead of shared authority and co-operation the Commission appears as the most powerful institution in the GMO authorization process. 106 Through the by now common practice of adopting the final decision by default following the reversed majority voting rule -a mechanism that originally was created for exceptional cases -the Commission reinstalls top down unilateral decision-making vis-à-vis the Member States in this process. The weakness of national representation in comitology is even more precarious as comitology networks are not able to effectively mitigate the strong influence of EFSA on the Commission. This, in turn, reinforces the scientification of the authorisation process.
The authorization process for the Pioneer maize 1507 epitomizes these problems. Interestingly, this was the only known case, in which the Commission has attempted to depart from EFSA's opinion, and to reject authorization. In 2007, former Commissioner Dimas presented a draft decision proposing not to approve maize 1507 for cultivation in the EU on the basis of the high degree of scientific uncertainty and the lack of scientific knowledge over significant traits of that GMO. The draft proposal stressed the need for a cautious approach based on the precautionary principle, and indicated that the degree of uncertainty was so high that it was 'not possible to establish appropriate management measures which would effectively mitigate the potential damage on the environment'. 107 However, instead of submitting the proposal to the Regulatory Committee, the Commission again turned to EFSA. As described in the previous section it asked EFSA to review its previous risk assessment in the light of eleven scientific publications. EFSA reaffirmed its previous findings stating that these publications did not provide new information that would change previous environmental risk assessments of maize 1507. 108 Following that the Commission made a U-turn in its position. It drafted a new proposal this time in favour of authorizing maize 1507. The Commission now relied on EFSA's statement that there is no evidence of the adverse effects of maize 1507 on human health and the environment taking over EFSA's suggestion for risk management strategies to minimise potential risks. 107 The document reported a number of objections raised by MSs concerning the impact on soil organisms and anthropods, the long-term effects of the Bt toxin on the environment, and it also pointed out that, ex lege, environmental risk assessments need to consider potential effects on non-target organisms and cumulative long-term effects which, at that time, were not adequately evaluated. Importantly, the Commission seemed to question the reliability of a meta-review of the applicant's assessment, marking the lack of crucial data such as the concentration of Bt toxin, and contesting the methodology used by EFSA in its assessment. In other words, EFSA's shift towards a more uncertainty tolerant approach was not followed by the Commission, but was instead met with a strikingly uncertainty intolerant response. This contradicts previous findings that the Commission inherits its uncertainty intolerance from EFSA. 113 At the time of writing, the Council decision on maize 1507 was still pending. 
Soft harmonisation of co-existence rules
A further example where a top-down approach to GMO regulation is being re-introduced through the backdoor, so-to-speak, is the management of co-existence between GM crops and other agricultural crops. As shown above, the exclusion of co-existence from the scope of harmonisation together with the use of a "soft law" instrument and multi-level expert networks under the auspices of the Commission suggest that co-existence was supposed to be managed in a de-centralised way.
However, in the institutional practice of managing co-existence the ideal of multi-level governance did not quite realise. Critical appraisals 117 of Commission's activities in this area suggest that its commitment to diversity and national autonomy may be a lip service. 115 European Parliament resolution of 16 January 2014 on the proposal for a Council decision concerning the placing on the market for cultivation, in accordance with Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of a maize product (Zea mays L., line 1507) genetically modified for resistance to certain lepidopteran pests (2013/2974 (RSP)). 116 In particular the resolution mentions the risks associated with that GMO's tolerance to the toxic herbicide glufocinate, which is supposed to be phased out in the EU by 2017. 117 Instead of enabling diversity and mutual learning the Commission has in fact tried, through the backdoor of its "soft" approach to co-existence, to implement its own narrow understanding of appropriate co-existence measures, and in this way to control national policies in this area.
The main problems in this regard are related to the way the Commission frames co-existence in its Co-existence Recommendation. 118 It has been observed that this "soft law" instrument is used to define the goals, scope and proportionality of national co-existence measures in a top-down and authoritative way. The Commission advocates a specific approach to co-existence management (namely a farm-level, crop-by-crop approach), 119 and outlines measures that it considers as appropriate. Most importantly, it defines co-existence in very narrow terms, namely as a purely economic issue. According to the Commission, since all environmental and health issues are dealt with in the authorization process, and only authorised GMOs can be cultivated in the EU, co-existence only covers the economic aspects associated with the admixture of GM and non-GM crops. 120 However, such a narrow framing of co-existence is highly contested. 121 It is being argued that especially ecological concerns, but also health and other socio-economic concerns continue to be relevant after authorisation.
Despite of its "soft" nature the Co-existence Recommendation seems to be highly influential in shaping national strategies, also because it is being used in a legal context strongly shaped by the constraints of EU internal market law; and by an institution, which plays a vital role in guarding the compliance with these legal obligations. 122 120 See Commission Recommendation on Co-existence, supra n. 129, Annex 1.2.. 121 See Lee, 'Multi-level governance' supra n. 69; Etty, 'Regulating Coexistence', supra n. 119. 122 See Etty, ibid. 123 Of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services, OJ (1998), L24/37. existence measures are technical regulations concerning products in the sense of this Directive, and thus have the potential to distort the internal market. Consequently, they need to be notified in draft form to the Commission and the other Member States before being adopted into national law. Measures that have not been duly notified cannot be enforced or invoked before the national courts. When assessing national co-existence measures in the TRIS framework the Commission refers to its own understanding of the proportionality and legality of national co-existence measures as defined in the Co-existence Recommendation. An example in this regard is the Commission's practice to object to national draft measures that apply purity standards for non-GM products stricter than the legal labelling threshold for GMOs (namely 0,9 %). As Thijs Etty observes, by doing so the Commission achieves a reinterpretation of the labelling threshold for GMOs, which is supposed to be a maximum tolerable adventitious impurity standard, as a minimum threshold for national regulatory intervention on co-existence. 124 The unilateral top-down definition of the goals and principles of co-existence in the Commission Recommendation, and the authoritative use of this instrument in the co-existence networks as well as within the TRIS framework demonstrate the trend toward top-down regulation in the management of co-existence. The Commission practice makes the Recommendation a type of "steering soft law," which has a strong normative, and even comes close to a binding effect. Maria Lee describes the governance arrangements of co-existence in the following terms:
'At the time of the moratorium, the European Commission had resisted legislating on coexistence, preventing harmonization. But now, paradoxically, it seems to be busy 're-Europeanizing' the whole area, asserting its own authority in a heavy-handed manner. The indirect control that the European Commission exercises now, however, is more autonomous than anything that it might have achieved through legislation. Unfortunately, it has left us with a framework that is obscure, both in its forum and in its technical, highly legalistic approach to a complex and subtle area. More generally, the role of the internal market tends to centralize authority on GMOs after authorization.' 125 124 See Etty supra n. 119. 125 Lee, 'Multi-level governance' supra n. 69 at 120-121.
III. Seeking escape routes -the Commission proposal on national 'opt-outs' for GMO cultivation
In response to the protracted problems of GMO regulation described above, Article 26b stipulates mainly two substantial conditions 134 for the lawful adoption of restrictive "opt-out" measures by a member state. 135 Firstly, the national measure must be based on grounds other than those covered by the environmental and health risk assessment carried out in the EU authorisation process. This is likely to refer to the socio-economic aspects of GMO cultivation. 136 It also indicates that the 130 This might seem unusual seeing that the measure does not aim at approximating national provisions on GMO cultivation, but rather at granting more freedom to the Member States to opt out from a harmonised framework for EU authorisations on GMO cultivation. See critical discussion in S. Poli, 'The Member States' long and winding road to partial regulatory autonomy in cultivating genetically modified crops in the EU' (2/2013) European Journal of Risk Regulation, 143. 131 Commission proposal, supra n. 128 at 11. 132 ibid at 8 and 11. 133 For an explanation of why the Commission decided to make that proposal see paper refereed for JCMS… 134 A further procedural requirement for the application of this "opt-out" clause would be the notification of the planned national measure to the other member states and the Commission one month prior to its adoption. In addition, the formulation "reasoned measures" in the last paragraph of the clause indicates a reason-giving requirement for the member state. 135 Note that this provision does not as such provide the freedom to regulate GMO cultivation at national rather than at EU level. The EU authorisation procedures as set out in the Deliberate Release Directive as regards cultivation of GM crops and in the Regulation 1829/2003 as regards cultivation of GMOs to be marketed in or as food are, at least formally, not affected by this amendment. Another implied condition for recourse to Article 26b, therefore, would be that the GMO in question has already been authorized at EU level in accordance with the Deliberate Release Directive or Regulation 1829/2003. Otherwise, of course, the free circulation of the GMO on the EU market would be unlawful as such due to the general prior-authorisation requirement for all GMOs to be marketed in the EU. 136 See European, Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on socio-economic implications of GMO cultivation on the basis of member purpose of creating Article 26b in addition to the already existent provision concerning the right of the Member States to adopt co-existence measures is to provide for a further, more extensive option for member states to deviate from EU authorisations on GMO cultivation on non-scientific grounds. Secondly, the national measure must be in conformity with the general law of the EU Treaties. 137 The Commission proposal is arguably the first genuine attempt to accommodate the diversity of national preferences towards GMOs in the Union. It is certainly a compromise ultimately aiming to remedy the impasse in comitology, thereby saving the EU authorization procedure including EFSA's central position within it. Rolling back EU harmonization has never happened before in the history of EU integration, and it was, of course, not the Commission's idea alone. 138 This makes it an astonishing process, while at the same time demonstrating the weakness of the Commission's political authority to decide on GMO cultivation for the Union as a whole. The proposal seems to acknowledge that a EU authorisation regime, which is enforced against the opposition of a majority of Member States, is not sustainable in the long term.
And yet, all hopes that the Commission proposal will be adopted as legislation are about to fade away. While the European Parliament adopted the draft with some amendments, 139 the passing of legislation has been blocked in the Council. 140 The latest attempt to reach political agreement took place under the Danish presidency in 2012. The latter prepared a compromise text, 141 which was able to obtain the approval of a large majority of the national representatives in the 
IV. Final remarks: The promise of deliberation in European risk governance
What does the present analysis of the 'GMO conundrum' teach us about deliberative theories of EU law and governance? It is sometimes suggested that EU regulation of GMOs is a unique, exceptional case, which makes generalization difficult. The extent to which the GMO case is unique stands in fact in direct negative proportion to the extent to which insights gained from the GMO case can be generalized. In other words, the more uniqueness we see the less generalization is possible.
There is arguably something exceptional about the regulatory conundrum in the field of EU regulation of GMOs. This exceptionality, however, is not intrinsic to the subject of agricultural biotechnology as such. Instead, the exceptional nature of EU regulation in this field refers to the high degree of institutional path- Firstly, the GMO case challenges the sociological basis of both the 2 nd dimension of CLC and its predecessor theory of deliberative supranationalism, namely that the EU comes closest to the ideal of transnational deliberation in networks as the basis for legitimate transnational governance 156 . While the EU legal structures of GMO regulation embody the idea of proceduralized cooperation and the balancing of different risk and non-risk concerns, rule implementation in practice failed to manage the political dimension of GMOs. In both deliberative fora of the authorization procedure, EFSA and comitology, de-centralised multi-level governance reverted to de-facto assertion of authority and top-down regulation overriding national concerns. Ultimately, the failure of cooperation and deliberation within these fora strengthened the Commission's reliance on scientific experts within the regime. As a result, in practice EU authorisation of GMOs, although not foreseen as such, reverts to a purely technocratic process.
It may well be that learning is easier to achieve in theory than in practice. In response to the GMO and other case studies of EU governance, especially in the field of Europe's economic crisis management, Joerges has recently suggested the need to reconceive CLC as a critical rather than re-constructive theory. 157 Moreover, the 2 nd dimension of CLC has to a certain extent evolved beyond the plea for deliberate supranationalism in transnational governance by developing an additional normative requirement. Regulatory outcomes of transnational governance must remain revisable by, for example, providing for the possibility of national opt-outs for those Member States whose legitimate regulatory concerns demand a deviation from the common European solution. 158 It seems therefore adequate to complement the 'trivial insight' 159 of deliberative supranationalism, namely that 'crises which can no longer be managed at the national level require transnational responses' with a similarly trivial insight that where transnational responses fail to produce legitimate solutions for the whole of the Union, a differentiated approach allowing for national derogations should be adopted. Seen in this light, the Commission reform proposal on national 'opt-outs' for GMO cultivation is a normatively desirable development even given its legal and political difficulties. Equally, the current impasse of the reform process in the Council of Ministers raises further legitimacy concerns.
Secondly, the GMO case also challenges related accounts of GMO regulation as an experimentalist governance regime. Also here, while the regulatory design can be characterized as building in elements of experimentalism, namely through its procedural structure of cooperation and bottom-up input of various actors, the account of implementation failure in this paper suggests a less optimistic view on the governance practice in this field. 160 As explained above, the input of lower-level units from the national level is de-facto precluded in both EFSA and the comitology procedure, and hindered in the management of co-existence post-authorization. This also stands in the way of mutual learning. The latter presupposes an open mind-set of all the actors, in the sense of their willingness to revise both their knowledge about and their attitudes towards GMOs in the light of contributions and experience made by other actors. This, however, is difficult to perceive in the current institutional deadlock, in which positions are both entrenched and politicized. It can, of course, not be excluded that institutional learning on a larger scale will eventually occur. The currently attempted reform of the GMO framework is certainly the result of a long and painful process of institutional failure and learning in this field. An essential condition of experimentalist governance is, however, that actors are able to agree on a common policy objective as a broad framework goal. Yet the political and societal divide on GMOs is so strong in the EU at the moment that neither Member States nor societal groups are able to agree on whether to allow or to prohibit the use of this technology in food and agriculture. They are not even able to agree to disagree, as the reform impasse illustrates.
All this indicates, however, that a response to the failure of deliberation and cooperation at EU level cannot be a return to top-down regulation with 'behind closed doors' technocratic deliberation. 161 It also contradicts the assumption that deliberation is fostered by technocratic 'behind close door' decision-making. In the GMO case the top-down imposition of epistemic authority has only increased politicization. Arguably, in cases of high political contestation and disagreement, especially in multi-level systems, deliberation remains the only way forward because it manages to keep decisions open, where no legitimate final authority is available.
EU's authority as a legal and political system is based on an ongoing contestation and resettlement of legal and political authority, 162 of which the GMO case serves as a vivid example. As one experimentalist scholar has aptly noted, such cases call for the 'no-final-decider principle' 163 according to which the EU might well not be the appropriate locus of authority to decide on GMO cultivation at present, but dialogue must go on.
What this chapter has shown, however, is that blaming politicization for the failure of deliberation in GMO regulation does not consider the full regulatory complexity in this field, and in particular the problematic effects of scientification, i.e.
an over-reliance on regulatory science and epistemic legitimacy as the basis for GMO 'Despite the best effort of many hard-working individuals and ongoing efforts to improve it, the system is not working as envisaged and is not, in aggregate, meeting its objectives. As the analysis in this report and earlier outputs from this evaluation have suggested, the 'dysfunction' arises as a consequence of a complex set of factors, both external and internal to the authorisation process.' 164 The report further notes that frustrations with the legislative framework among the consulted parties concentrate on the risk management phase. However, it continues stating that 'many of the causal factors behind the blockages in decision- 164 EPEC report supra n. 70 at 73. 165 Ibid at 76; see also at 14-32: 'the effective functioning of the institutional decision-making phase of the legislative process critically depends on confidence in the risk assessment.'
In the case of EU GMO regulation we are facing the problem of delegitimation of the EU public administration. Overreliance on EFSA to produce authoritative scientific advice, the Commission's dependency on epistemic legitimacy as the sole basis for risk management together with the failure of the comitology system to exercise political responsibility increasingly contributes to the sense that the EU institutions involved have disqualified themselves as legitimate decision-makers in this field. A successful reform is challenging as it must be able to mitigate the negative effects of both processes, namely of politicization and of scientification.
